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Abstract
We study a setting where the opportunism or commitment problem identied by
Hart and Tirole (1990) may arise. An upstream monopolist may sell its product to
two di¤erentiated downstream retailers. Contract unobservability induces the man-
ufacturer and each retailer to free-ride on margins earned by rival retailers, resulting
in low transfer prices and low overall prot. OBrien and Sha¤er (1992) proposed a
solution to this problem involving squeezing retail margins by using maximum RPM
and high transfer prices. We show that when retail demand depends in any degree
of retail sales e¤ort, this equilibrium breaks down, and the opportunism problem
reappears with full force. We show that no type of own-sale contracts or combina-
tion of own-sale restraints will solve the problem if sales e¤ort matter. Moreover we
show that certain horizontal commitments, as for example industry-wide minimum
RPM, may restore the fully integrated outcome, but only in special cases.
Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Fosswinckels Gate 14, N-5007 Bergen, Norway
(tommy.gabrielsen@econ.uib.no, bjorn.johansen@econ.uib.no). We would like to thank Steinar Vagstad
and Mario Monti for comments on an earlier draft of this article. We would also like to thank Gordon
Klein and the rest of the participants at the kick-o¤ workshop Competition and Bargaining in Vertical
Chainsat DICE in Düsseldorf for their comments.
1
SNF Working Paper No 30/13
1 Introduction
The opportunism problem arising when a manufacturer contracts secretly with down-
stream retailers has been recognized in the literature for a long time. An upstream
manufacturer with market power has an interest of restricting supply to its retailers to
preserve its market power which in turn can be shared with the retailers. However, due to
secret contracts when contracting with each retailer, the manufacturer has an incentive to
free-ride on the margins earned by his other retailers. This incentive, known as the "op-
portunism problem" has been shown by Hart and Tirole (1990) with downstream Cournot
competition, OBrien and Sha¤er (1992) with Bertrand competition and also by McAfee
and Schwartz (1994). In general, the problem prevents the manufacturer from realizing
its market power upstream. Even though the manufacturer might be in a monopoly po-
sition, its inability to commit itself opens for opportunistic behavior which prevents the
monopolist from achieving the monopoly outcome. The avour of the problem is similar
to the Coasian conjecture facing a monopolist of a durable good; the monopolist can not
avoid reducing his price.
Recently, in an EU merger case concerning Unilever and a smaller upstream com-
petitor, the DG-Comp presented evidence where retailers expressed explicit concerns for
the opportunism problem. As usual in merger cases in upstream markets, the fear was
that the merger would allow the merged entity to increase its prices to retailers. The
EU-commission found evidence indicating that retailers across the concerned EU mem-
ber states "would accept (input)price increases if applied generally in the market" and
Unilever presented evidence where "retailers expressed doubts on how they can be sure
that Unilever indeed would uniformly increase prices across all customers", indicating the
awareness of the opportunism problem among retailers.1
The essence of the problem can be illustrated with downstream price competition.
In this case, when negotiating with each retailer, the manufacturer and each retailer
are maximizing their bilateral prots, and thus ignores quasi-rents earned by the other
retailers. This induces each retailer and the manufacturer to free-ride on these rents, and
in equilibrium they end up setting transfer prices at marginal cost. There has been several
proposals in the literature suggesting how the manufacturer may circumvent the problem.
Hart and Tirole (1990) argue that vertical integration may be a way to remonopolize
the market. If an upstream monopolistic rm can vertically integrate with one of several
homogeneous retailers, he will have no incentive to supply the unintegrated retailers and
the manufacturer can restore the monopoly outcome. Also, as noted by Hart and Tirole
1See case M.5658 UNILEVER / SARA LEE BODY CARE (2010), #216 and 219.
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(1990) and Rey and Tirole (2006) signing an exclusive dealing contract with one retailer
may also solve the problem. However, if retailers serve partially overlapping markets there
will be a loss of potential prot from selling though a single retailer in the downstream
market. In these cases vertical integration and exclusive contracts will generally not be
enough to fully solve the problem.
OBrien and Sha¤er (1992) proposed a di¤erent solution. They showed that by squeez-
ing the downstream margins, through individual price ceilings (maximum RPM) coupled
with high wholesale prices, the manufacturer may solve the problem. Intuitively, the prob-
lem arises due to positive quasi-rents earned by retailers, and by eliminating these rents,
no free-riding can occur. The result that maximum RPM can eliminate opportunism has
later been conrmed also by Rey and Verge (2004) and Montez (2012), but in di¤erent
settings. Montez (2012) shows that a monopolist producer may eliminate opportunism
by using buybacks and (sometimes) a price ceiling. In a similar setting as OBrien and
Sha¤er (1992), Rey and Verge (2004) show that equilibria with wary beliefs (as opposed
to passive beliefs as in OBrien and Sha¤er, 1992) exist and reect opportunism, and that
a maximum RPM with a price squeeze will eliminate the scope for opportunism also in
this case. In sum, these papers suggest that a maximum price may be detrimental to
consumers because it eliminates the scope for opportunism. Since in most jurisdictions
maximum RPM is considered unproblematic, these results challenges antitrust policy that
tends to focus solely on minimum and xed RPM. Our contribution in relation to this
literature is to introduce retailer sales e¤ort into the model.
Our paper is therefore also related to the literature that show that RPMmay encourage
retailers to o¤er sales service which otherwise might not be o¤ered due to the free-riding
problem between retailers (Telser, 1960 andMathewson andWinter, 1984). This literature
assumes that retail contracts are observable before retailers compete at the nal stage.
The focus in this literature is how vertical restraints (RPM) may solve vertical externalities
and improve the e¢ ciency in the vertical structure. Mathewson and Winter (1984) show
that the manufacturer in such a case will adopt a minimum RPM in order to prevent free-
riding and encourage retailer sales e¤ort when there are positive e¤ort spillovers between
the retailers.
In sum, these two branches of the literature tell us that with unobservable contracts
and no sales e¤ort, maximum RPM may be detrimental because it increases prices to
consumers by solving the opportunism problem. On the other hand, when contracts
are observable and sales e¤ort is of any importance for demand, RPM may be e¢ ciency
enhancing for the vertical structure as it may be used to control retail sales e¤ort and
prevent free-riding. We believe that unobservable contracts in most cases is the most
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realistic assumption. Also we nd it hard to come up with an example where retailer sales
e¤ort is of no importance for retail demand. We therefore propose a model incorporating
both these features, i.e. unobservable contracts and that retail demand depends on retail
sales e¤ort. Such a model has to our knowledge not been studied before, and the analysis
produces interesting results.
We rst show that when the manufacturer is only allowed to use two-part tari¤s, we
obtain the standard outcome: the manufacturers opportunism problem prevents extrac-
tion of the full monopoly rent, and, moreover, that the unique contract equilibrium in this
case yields the standard Bertrand prices and e¤ort levels. Second, we show that the use of
general non-linear contracts and RPM, as suggested by OBrien and Sha¤er (1992), is not
su¢ cient to restore the monopoly prots. In fact, we show that (purely bilateral) RPM
contracts, irrespective of type, has no e¤ect, and we therefore obtain standard Bertrand
prices and e¤ort level in all equilibria. Importantly, this result holds irrespective of the
importance of retailerse¤ort, and irrespective of the type of spillovers in e¤ort. Hence,
short of any horizontalagreement that restrict the manufacturers contracts with rival
retailers, there exists no vertical own-sale contracts or (combination of) own-sale restraints
that can solve the opportunism problem.
On the other hand, when exploring horizontal contracts, such as a commitment to
industry-wide vertical price xing, we show that such contracts can mitigate the man-
ufacturers opportunism problem. Yet, we show that the fully integrated outcome is
restored only in special cases where a industry-wide price restraint is used. Importantly,
the price restraint will here have to be introduced as a minimum price, not as a maximum
price. Moreover, we explore the welfare e¤ects of allowing for industry-wide minimum
RPM. We show that, even if consumers value sales e¤ort, and even if there is freeriding
among retailers, the consumers benet from a industry-wide price oor only in special
cases.
The rest of the papers is organized as follows. The next section presents our model,
our basic assumptions and our benchmark. Section 3 contains the analysis and presents
our main results assuming own-sale contracts, and in Section 4 we derive our results with
horizontal contracts. Section 5 briey discusses vertical integration as a mean to solve
the problem. Our conclusions are contained in Section 6.
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2 The model
We follow OBrien and Sha¤er (1992) (OS from now on) and consider the classic setup
for the opportunism problem with downstream price competition. We have a vertically
related industry with an upstream monopolist, M , who produces an intermediate good
which he sells to two downstream di¤erentiated retailers, R1 and R2; using unobservable
non-linear contracts. The two retailers transform the manufacturers good on a one-to-one
basis into two symmetrically di¤erentiated nal goods, and sell them to consumers.
In contrast to OS, but as in Mathewson and Winter (1984) we introduce retailer
sales e¤ort that enhance demand. We denote retailer Ris demand by Di (e;p), where
e = (e1; e2) denotes the vector of the retailerssales e¤ort, and p = (p1; p2) denotes the
vector of retail prices. For all Di (:) > 0, demand is assumed to be downward sloping in
the own-price pi and increasing in own-e¤ort ei, with @eiDi > 0 and @eieiDi  0.2 For
some of our results, we will invoke the following set of assumptions about the retailers
demand (assuming both Di and Dj are positive):
A1. All else equal, a uniform increase in p1 and p2 causes Di to fall, which implies that
@piDi + @pjDi < 0
A2. All else equal, a uniform increase in e1 and e2 causes Di to rise, which implies that
@eiDi + @ejDi > 0
A3. All else equal, a marginal increase in pi causes total demand to fall, @piDi+@piDj < 0
A4. All else equal, a marginal increase in ei causes total demand to rise, @eiDi+@eiDj > 0
For any pj, we also assume that there is a choke-price, pi = p (pj) ; implicitly dened
by Di (pi; pj) = 0, above which demand for good i is zero. Because the retailers are
substitutes, we have that p0 (pj) > 0.
We make no specic assumption about the e¤ect of Ris e¤ort on the rivals demand,
@eiDj. Hence, we allow for both positive, negative and no spillovers in retail e¤ort. We
denote the retailers e¤ort cost by Ci = C (ei), which is assumed to be twice continuously
di¤erentiable, with C 0i (ei) > 0 and C
00
i (ei) > 0 8ei > 0, and it is assumed to satisfy the
Inada conditions at 0 and 1. We will denote Ris per-unit e¤ort cost by i =  (ei) :=
Ci=Di: All other retailing costs are assumed to be zero. We assume throughout the
analysis that a retailers sales e¤ort is non-veriable and hence also non-contractable.
We consider the following simple two-stage game played between the manufacturer
and the two retailers: At stage 1 (the contracting stage), the manufacturer makes take-it-
2We will sometimes denote by @xif the parital derivative of f with respect to xi, @xixif the second
partial derivative, @xixjf = @
2f=@xi@xj the cross-partial derivative, and so on.
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or-leave-it contract o¤ers T1 and T2 simultaneously and secretly to each retailer, which the
retailers subsequently either accept or reject. A retailer never observes his rivals contract
terms. At stage two (the competition stage), accepted contracts are implemented and
retailers compete by simultaneously choosing their prices and e¤ort levels.
A contract Ti (:) can take various (non-linear) forms. We will consider three classes of
contracts used by M at the contracting stage:
1. Simple two-part tari¤s, of the form Ti (Di) = Fi +wiDi, where Fi is a xed fee and
wi is a per-unit transfer price. We will denote these contracts by (Fi; wi) :
2. General own-sale contracts. A (non-linear) contract Ti betweenM and Ri is called
an own-sale contract if it does not put restrictions on Ms trade relationship (con-
tract) with retailer Rj.
Own-sale contracts can in general include any restriction or requirement for the
quantity resold by Ri, and any restriction or requirement for the price that Ri is
allowed to charge in the downstream market. I.e., own-sale contracts can put restric-
tions on the buyers actions in the downstream market but do not put restrictions
on the sellers actions vis-a-vis other retailers in the upstream market.
Examples of restrictions that can be included in own-sale contracts are individual
price oors or ceilings, restrictions on the customers/ geographic area that the re-
tailer is allowed to sell to; restrictions or requirements for the quantity bought or
resold (quantity or sales forcing), retroactive discounts, market-share discounts, etc.
3. Horizontal contracts. A (non-linear) contract between M and Ri is called a hori-
zontal contract if it puts restrictions on Ms trade relationship (contract) with the
rival retailer Rj:
Examples of this are industry-wide vertical price xing; any commitments from M
to sell exclusively to Ri; agreements that give Ri exclusive rights to a specic set of
consumers or over a specic geographic area, non-discrimination clauses, etc. All of
these provisions put restrictions on the contract that M can legally o¤er to Rj.
We let Ms prot be given M =
P2
i=1 (Ti   cDi), and let Ris prot be given by
i = (pi   i)Di   Ti:
To stick as close as possible to OSoriginal analysis, we will employ the "contract
equilibrium" concept formalized by Cremér and Riordan (1987).
Denition 1. Let A be the set of allowable contracts and s = (si) be the vector of
retailers strategies in the downstream market, where si = (pi; ei), i 2 f1; 2g. A contract
6
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equilibrium with unobservable contracts is then a vector of supply contracts T2 A, and
Nash equilibrium in prices and e¤ort levels s induced by these contracts, such that 8i
and 8Ti 2 A, T i is the contract that maximizes the bilateral joint prot of M and Ri,
taking
 
T j ;s

j

as given. Formally, T 2 A constitutes a contract equilibrium i¤
M (T
; s) + i (T; s)  M
 
T 0i ; s
0
i; T

j ; s

j

+ i
 
T 0i ; s
0
i; T

j ; s

j

;
8i and 8T 0i 2 A, and where, the contract T 0i induces the strategy s0i by Ri at the nal
stage, given
 
T j ;s

j

.
This equilibrium concept is very simple and tractable. It says that in a contract equilib-
rium, there is no room for a retailer-manufacturer pair M   Ri to revise their contract
and increase their bilateral joint prot, holding xed Ms contract with Rj, and holding
xed Rjs choice of e¤ort and price. A contract equilibriums dening characteristic is
therefore that it survives bilateral deviations, i.e. where a pairM  Ri decides to secretly
renegotiate their contract terms.3 Note that, with restrictions on the set of allowable
contracts, there may exist a contract outside the set, T 0i =2 A, that, if T 0i could be enforced
by a court, would allow M  Ri to increase their bilateral joint prots.
2.1 Two benchmarks
Under our assumptions on the demand, when marginal transfer prices are constant and
equal to Ms marginal cost c, the nal-stage Bertrand game has a unique equilibrium
where both retailers exert the same e¤ort and set the same prices, characterized by
fpB; eBg = argmax
pi;ei
(pi   c  i)Di
 
ei; e
B; pi; p
B

(1)
In the following we will refer to pB as the standard Bertrand price. We denote respec-
tively by DB := Di
 
eB; eB; pB; pB

and B =
 
pB   c    eBDB the quantity sold and
the prot earned (gross of any xed transfers) by each retailer in this standard Bertrand
equilibrium.
3As noted by Rey and Vergé (2004), however, a weakness with contract equilibria is that they do
not always survive multilateral deviations, where the manufacturer revises his o¤ers and deviates (se-
cretly) with both retailers simultaneously. Hence, a contract equilibrium does not always constitute a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (with passive beliefs). To avoid the latter, one could imagine a contracting
game where the manufacturer uses a pair of agents that simulatenously and independently negotiates
contracts with the retailers on the manufacturers behalf. This would rule out multilateral deviations per
construction.
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Next, we characterize the outcome when the industry is fully integrated (both verti-
cally and horizontally). The overall industry prot can be written
 =
N=2X
i=1
(pi   c  i)Di (2)
The integrated monopolists rst-order conditions for the retail price and sales e¤ort, can
be written as
@pi =
N=2X
k=1
(pk   c) @piDk +Di = 0; i = 1; 2 (3)
and
@ei =
N=2X
k=1
(pk   c) @eiDk   C 0i = 0; i = 1; 2 (4)
We let p1 = p2 = pI and e1 = e2 = eI denote the prices and e¤ort levels respectively that
simultaneously solves the monopolists rst order conditions, and denote by I > 2B
the resulting integrated prot.
3 Analysis and main results
In this section we analyze the equilibrium outcome under di¤erent assumptions regarding
the set of allowable contracts. We start by exploring the simplest case where the manu-
facturer is conned to using simple two-part tari¤s. Then we proceed by investigating the
equilibrium outcome under the OS contract assumptions, i.e. allowing general non-linear
contracts and RPM. We then expand the set of allowable contracts by investigating any
type of own-salecontracts (as dened above). We show that there is no contract of this
type that is able to mitigate the opportunism problem.
3.1 Two-part tari¤s
Suppose M has o¤ered a contract
 
wj ; F

j

to Rj, and that this contract induces price
and e¤ort
 
pj ;e

j

by Rj at the nal stage. Given this, we can write the retailersprot as
i = (pi   wi   i)Di
 
ei; e

j ; pi; p

j
  Fi; i = 1; 2 (5)
which yields the rst-order conditions
(pi   wi) @piDi +Di = 0; i = 1; 2 (6)
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and
(pi   wi) @eiDi   C 0i = 0; i = 1; 2 (7)
We let pi (wi) and e

i (wi), i = 1; 2; be the price and e¤ort levels that simultaneously solve
the retailersrst-order conditions, where @wip

i > 0 and @wie

i < 0, and p

i
 
wj

= pj and
ei
 
wj

= ej (due to symmetry). We can then write the joint prot of M  Ri, which we
denote by VM Ri, as a function of Ris contract terms, as
VM Ri =
(
N=2X
k=1
(pk   c   (ek))Dk
)
   pj   wj   j  ejDj + F j , i 6= j 2 1; 2 (8)
The rst-order condition for maximizing (8) wrt. wi, is
@wiVM Ri =@wip

i [Di + (p

i   c) @piDi] + @wiei [(pi   c) @eiDi   C 0i] (9)
+
 
wj   c

(@wip

i@piDj + @wie

i@eiDj) = 0; i 6= j 2 1; 2
Substituting (6) and (7) into (9), and simplifying, gives the following necessary conditions
for (F;w;p; e) to form a contract equilibrium:
N=2X
k=1
(wk   c)
n
@wip

i@piDk + @wie

i@eiDk
o
= 0, i = 1; 2 (10)
We can rewrite (10) using matrix notation as (w   c)Dd= 0, where w = (w1; w2),
c = (c; c) and
Dd =
264 @w1p1@p1D1 + @w1e1@e1D1 @w1p1@p1D2 + @w1e1@e1D2
@w2p

2@p2D1 + @w2e

2@e2D1 @w2p

2@p2D2 + @w2e

2@e2D2
375 (11)
Note that, if consumer demand is una¤ected by retailerse¤ort, as is the setting in OS
original model, then Dd reduces to a 2-by-2 matrix of demand derivatives with respect to
prices only. By assumptions A1-A4, Dd is always invertible. This gives us the following
result.
Proposition 1. (Two-part tari¤s) A contract equilibrium always exists where the mar-
ginal wholesale prices (w1; w

2) are the same and equal to Ms marginal production cost
c. By assumptions A1-A2, contract equilibria with w1 = w2 > c or w1 = w2 < c, do not
exist. By assumptions A1-A4, the contract equilibrium with w1 = w

2 = c is unique.
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Proposition 1 conrms the opportunism problem that arises with unobservable con-
tracting, but here generalized to a setting where the retailers also exert some sales e¤ort
downstream.
3.2 General own-sale contracts and RPM
We now turn to the situation whereM is allowed to use RPM together with more general
non-linear contracts. In fact, we allow the manufacturer to impose any restrictions on the
retailers own-sales. Before we move on, we state the following Lemma, which we have
adopted from OSoriginal paper and generalized to a setting that allows for retailers
sales e¤ort
Lemma 1. If (T; s) forms a contract equilibrium with general own-sale contracts (and
RPM), then 8j, T j is continuous and di¤erentiable at the quantity Dj induced by (T;p).
If the contracts entail a commitment to industry-wide price xing, then the same result
holds, as long as there are spillovers in retailerssales e¤ort.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 greatly simplies the rest of the analysis, and the intuition for the result is
straightforward: First, notice that if T j (Dj) was not continuous at Dj = D

j , then either
a marginal reduction or a marginal increase in Dj would cause the payment from Rj toM
to either jump up or down. This means that either M  Ri could increase their bilateral
joint prot by inducing a marginal change in pi (or, with spillovers in e¤ort, by inducing
a marginal change in ei) that would cause T j to jump up, or Rj could increase his prot
through marginal changes in either pj or ej that would cause T j to jump down. For this
reason, T j has to be continuous at the equilibrium quantity D

j . From this it just remains
to show that T j (Dj) also is di¤erentiable at Dj = D

j , which is shown in the Appendix.
Next, notice that Lemma 1 has implications for what types of vertical restraints M
can impose on its retailers in equilibrium. For example, any sales-forcing contracts,
or contracts that seek to force the retailer to reach a certain market share threshold,
would be ine¤ectual. The reason is simply that these tari¤s (per denition) would have
to jump when deviating slightly from the forcingquantity or market-share. Retroactive
discounts would be ine¤ectual for exactly the same reason.
When proceeding the analysis, we rst show that it is impossible for the manufacturer
to induce the integrated prot I when using general own-sale contracts and RPM. To
10
SNF Working Paper No 30/13
see this, notice that in any contract equilibrium (T; s), pi and e

i would have to solve
4
(
N=2X
k=1
(pk   c) @piDk +Di
)
  @piDj
 
pj   T 0j

= 0 (12)
and (
N=2X
k=1
(pk   c) @eiDk   C 0i
)
  @eiDj
 
pj   T 0j

= 0: (13)
Note that the terms in the curly brackets are equal to zero when both pi = p

j = p
I
and ei = e

j = e
I . Hence, given that pj = p
I and ej = e
I , for it to be optimal for the
pair M   Ri to induce pi = pI and ei = eI , at the quantity Dj the marginal transfer
price T 0j would have to be equal to the integrated price, p
I . However, note that Rjs
rst-order condition for optimal sales e¤ort at the nal stage is
 
pj   T 0j

@eiDj C 0j = 0.
At T 0j = p
I , Rjs prot on the last unit sold when exerting sales e¤ort ej = eI > 0, is
negative. Hence, pi = p

j = p
I and ei = e

j = e
I cannot both hold in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. (General own-sale contracts) In equilibrium, it is not possible for the
manufacturer to induce the integrated prot I .
The intuition for this result is straightforward. To overcome the opportunism problem,
the manufacturer has to take into account Rjs quasi-rents when making his contract o¤er
to Ri, and vice versa. As suggested by OS, one way to do this is to eliminate the retailers
quasi-rents completely. For example, by xing the retail prices and then squeezing the
retailersmark-ups through high marginal transfer prices. However, to induce the retailers
to exert some e¤ort, the retailers have to earn strictly positive quasi-rents on the margin,
to cover their marginal e¤ort cost. Because it is not possible for the manufacturer to
achieve both simultaneously, the integrated outcome is unattainable.
We now show that general own-sale contracts and RPM in fact yield the same outcome
as simple two-part tari¤s do. To see this, note that rst-order maximizing condition
for Ri at the nal stage is (pi   T 0i ) @eiDi   C 0i = 0. Substituting this into (13), and
simplifying, leaves us with the following necessary conditions for (T; s) to form a contract
equilibrium: (
N=2X
k=1
(pk   c) @piDk +Di
)
  @piDj
 
pj   T 0j

= 0; i = 1; 2 (14)
4Because the manufacturer can use RPM, he is free to use Ti to induce the right level of e¤ort ei.
Hence, we can think of M  Ri as choosing both pi and ei directly at the contracting stage.
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and
N=2X
k=1
(T 0k   c) @eiDk = 0; i = 1; 2 (15)
Condition (15) can be rewritten with matrix notation as (T0 c)De = 0; where T0 =
(T 01 ; T
0
2 ) and De is the 2-by-2 matrix of demand derivatives with respect to retailer sales
e¤ort. By assumption A2, De is always invertible, which gives us the following result.
Proposition 3. (General own-sale contracts) In all contract equilibria we have that i) the
marginal transfer prices are the same for each retailer and equal to the manufacturers
marginal cost c, ii) retail prices are equal to pB, and iii) each retailers sales e¤ort is
equal to eB.
Proposition 3 shows that by introducing just a small e¤ect of retailer sales e¤ort on
demand, the manufacturers opportunism problem is restored with full force, and the
RPM equilibrium introduced by OS breaks down. The intuition for this is the following:
To overcome the temptation to o¤er the retailers sweetheart deals, that would allow a
retailer to charge a lower price at its rivals expense, the manufacturer can impose a price
ceiling equal to pI and then squeeze the retailerssales margins by charging high marginal
transfer prices, T 0i ! pI ; i = 1; 2. However, this cannot arise in any contract equilibrium
if retailers also exert some sales e¤ort. The reason is that, given that the retailersmark-
ups are squeezed, the manufacturer can protably deviate with either retailer and charge
it a slightly lower marginal transfer price, which would induce the retailer to make (more)
sales e¤ort at the last stage of the game. This means that a strategy of squeezing the
retailersmargins cannot arise in any contract equilibrium, and that each retailer has to
earn strictly positive quasi-rents. This opens the door for opportunism again.
From Lemma 1 we also know that it does not work to combine RPM with any other
own-sale restrictions or tari¤ schemes, such as restrictions on the retailers customer base,
sales forcing, market-share contracts, retroactive discounts, etc.
4 Horizontal contracts
Intuitively, the reason why general own-sale contracts cannot be used to curtail oppor-
tunism and induce higher prices, is that these contracts do not restrict the type of o¤ers
the manufacturer can (legally) make to rival retailers. Hence, imposing individual price
ceilings and then squeezing the retailersmargins, for example, does not work because
the manufacturer is allowed to secretly o¤er one of the retailers a lower marginal transfer
12
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price which in turn would induce that retailer to make some sales e¤ort downstream
and increase her joint prot with the manufacturer. In turn this deviation provides an
incentive to deviate on the resale prices as well.
Horizontal restraints, such as industry-wide RPM and closed territory distribution
(CTD), on the other hand, may work, because these contracts (by denition) restricts the
set of contracts that the manufacturer can establish with rival retailers. We now analyze
these two types of restraints in turn and provide conditions for when these restraints may
(not) help the manufacturer fully restore the rst-best outcome.
4.1 Industry-wide price xing
Industry-wide vertical price xing describes a situation where the manufacturer is able to
commit to adopting a common resale price throughout the downstream market. We can
model this by incorporating a stage prior to the contracting stage, where the manufacturer
commits publicly to an industry-wide resale price to be imposed on both of its retailers,
before negotiating transfer prices privately and secretly with each retailer at stage 2.5
Denition 2. We dene pS and eS := e
 
pS

as the semi-collusive6 price and e¤ort
level respectively, where
e (p) := argmax
ei
[p  c  i]Di (ei; e (p) ; p; p)
and
pS = argmax
p
[p  c   (e (p))]
X
i
Di (e
 (p) ; e (p) ; p; p) :
Finally, we let S represent the semi-collusive prot,
S :=
 
pS   c    eSX
i
Di
 
eS; eS; pS; pS

We now show that the use of industry-wide price xing may allow the manufacturer
to induce the integrated optimum I , but only as long as there are no spillovers in sales
e¤ort. To see this, note rst that, in any contract equilibrium (T; s) with industry-wide
5This resembles the set-up in Dobson and Waterson (2007), who analyze the use of observable linear
tari¤s and industry-wide RPM in a bilateral oligopoly setting.
6This might involve a slight abuse of the term "semi-collusion", but from the dention it should be
clear what we mean.
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RPM, ei would have to solve the condition(
N=2X
k=1
(p   c) @eiDk   C 0i
)
  @eiDj
 
p   T 0j

= 0; i = 1; 2 (16)
Substituting in retailer is condition for optimal sales e¤ort, (p   T 0i ) @eiDi C 0i = 0, we
obtain the following necessary condition for (T; s) to arise as a contract equilibrium:
N=2X
k=1
(T 0k   c) @eiDk = 0; i = 1; 2 (17)
which is identical to condition (15) above. Hence, in all contract equilibria, the marginal
transfer prices are again equal to the manufacturers marginal cost c. Importantly, this
result is independent of the industry-wide resale price chosen by M at the rst stage of
the game.We state this in Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 2. (Industry-wide RPM) In all contract equilibria the marginal transfer prices
are the same for each retailer and equal to the manufacturers marginal cost c.
With an industry-wide resale price equal to p set by the manufacturer at the rst stage
of the game, the unique Nash equilibrium at the nal stage therefore has each retailer
exerting sales e¤ort equal to e (p) (Denition 2). The manufacturers optimal industry-
wide resale price in this game is therefore characterized by
p = argmax
p
[p  c   (e (p))]
X
i
Di (e
 (p) ; e (p) ; p; p) (18)
We then have the following result.
Proposition 4. (Industry-wide RPM) If the manufacturer can commit to an industry-
wide price oor he is able to induce the semi-collusive outcome S as dened in Denition
2. The semi-collusive outcome may coincide with the fully integrated outcome I , but only
as long as @eiDj = 0; i 6= j 2 f1; 2g.
The intuition is again very simple. Each retailer will only take into account the e¤ect of
its sales e¤ort on its own demand. Hence, when facing a marginal transfer price equal to
the true marginal cost of the manufacturer, and the minimum retail price is set at the
integrated level pI ; each retailer will provide too little service with positive spillovers and
too much service when spillovers are negative. Hence, pS = pI and eS = eI cannot both
hold when there are spillovers in e¤ort.
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Without spillovers in sales e¤ort, on the other hand, allowing for industry-wide RPM
fully restores the manufacturers ability to induce the integrated outcome: The manu-
facturer can then commit to the integrated price pI at the rst stage of the game, and
marginal transfer prices equal to c which characterizes the unique equilibrium at the
contracting stage are then su¢ cient to induce each retailer to exert the integrated level
of sales e¤ort eI at the nal stage.
Note also that S  2B has to hold, because the manufacturer could always replicate
the outcome 2B by committing to the standard Bertrand price pB at the rst stage.
Moreover, we may also note that the industry-wide resale price pS, would have to be
introduced either as a xed price or as a price oor not as a price ceiling. The reason
is that all contract equilibria are again characterized by marginal cost pricing for the
manufacturers product. Hence, a minimum or xed price p > pB is needed to prevent
retailers from charging the standard Bertrand price at the nal stage. Therefore, according
to our analysis, minimum or xed RPM may be harmful in some cases especially when
the e¤ect of sales e¤ort is relatively small and insignicant whereas maximum RPM is
never harmful in this case. This is also in line with current competition policy in the EU,
for example.
To provide a sense for the potential welfare implications of allowing for an industry-
wide price oor in our setting, we are going to evaluate consumerswelfare using two
di¤erent representative utility functions,
U1 = Y + v
2X
i=1
qi   1
1 + 
8<:12
2X
i=1
(2qi   Ai) qi + 
2
 
2X
i=1
qi
!29=; (19)
and
U2 = Y + v
2X
i=1
qi   1
B (1 + )
0@ 2X
i=1
q2i +

2
 
2X
i=1
qi
!21A ; (20)
where Y is consumersincome, qi is the quantity purchased by the consumer from retailer
i 2 f1; 2g ; and  2 [0;1) is a measure for the substitutability between retailers. In U1,
we have
Ai = (2 +  (1 + )) ei + (2+  (1 + )) ej; i 6= j 2 f1; 2g
where  2 [0; 1] is a measure for spillovers in e¤ort provision. I.e., we consider here
positive spillovers only, but of a varying degree.
In U2, we have B = a+e1+e2; where a  0, which implies that each retailers demand
is a function of the sum of the retailerse¤ort only (each retailers e¤ort spills fully over
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to the rival). Finally, we assume that the retailerse¤ort cost is given by Ci = e2i =2,
i = 1; 2; where  > 1.
Subject to the income restraint, we get the following consumer direct demand func-
tions:
qi = Di =
1
2

v + ei + ej   (1 + ) pi + 
2
(p1 + p2)

; i = 1; 2
from U1 and
qi = Di =
a+ e1 + e2
2

v   (1 + ) pi + 
2
(p1 + p2)

; i = 1; 2
from U2. Note nally that for a = 1 and e1 = e2 = 0, U1 and U2 both yield the same
Shubik-Levitan (1980) demand function.
By comparing the representative consumers net utility when retailers set the standard
Bertrand prices and e¤ort levels
 
pB; eB

, with the consumers net utility under the semi-
collusive price and e¤ort levels
 
pS; eS

, we get the following result.
Proposition 5. Given the utility function U1, consumer surplus always falls when we al-
low the manufacturer to commit to an industry-wide price oor. Given the utility function
U2, we have the following:
 If a > (v   c)2 = (12), consumer surplus always falls with an industry-wide price
oor.
 If a < (v   c)2 = (12), consumer surplus may increase with an industry-wide price
oor, but only as long as the degree of substitution between retailers  is su¢ ciently
high. The lower bound for the degree of substitution required for consumers surplus
to increase in some cases, is   20:9 (when a = 0)
This result is important, because it challenges the claim that  in a setting where re-
tailers freeride on each others service provisions  price oors create e¢ ciencies that
ultimately benet the end consumers. This claim is based on the earlier literature that
investigates the manufacturers rationale for using vertical restraints (e.g., RPM) in a
game with perfect information (e.g. Mathewson and Winter, 1984). The crucial assump-
tion that di¤erentiates the results in this literature from ours, is the assumption that the
manufacturer can commit to a set of public contracts.
An example of the linear model given by (19) above, but casted in a setting with
observable contracts, is given in Motta (2004, pp 326-331). Motta shows that price oors
in that case always increase both consumer and overall welfare. On the other hand, our
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proposition states that if the manufacturer can commit to a common price oor for both
retailers, but we assume that retailers otherwise do not have information about rivals
contract terms, the result in Motta is turned around; consumers then always lose when
we allow the manufacturer to commit to a set of minimum prices. However, the welfare
implications for consumers clearly depends on how demand reacts to retailerse¤ort. If
e¤ort is critical for generating consumer demand (e.g., U2 with a = 0), then consumer
surplus may increase with public price oors but only if very little service e¤ort would
be provided without the publicly observable price restraint (i.e., when competition is very
erce).
To sum up, the analysis above shows that in a setting where retailers provide valuable
services, consumers in many cases will lose when we allow for a publicly imposed price
oor, given that the retailerscontract terms are otherwise unobservable.
4.2 Closed territory distribution
Closed territory distribution (CTD) is the contractual provision that gives retailers ex-
clusive rights to sell the manufacturers product to customers residing in their assigned
areas. CTD generally also imply that a retailer is required to turn away any potential
customer who has his residence or place of business outside of the assigned area (Warren,
1968 p.1).
To gain some insight on how CTD and industry-wide RPMmay or may not restore the
integrated outcome, consider the following situation: Imagine that the retailers demand
can be written Di = miqi, where mi is the mass of customers buying from Ri, and qi is
the demand of each individual customer. Using this, we can write the integrated rms
rst-order condition for optimal sales e¤ort as
 
pI   cnqi@eimi +mi@eiqi + qj@eimj +mj@eiqjo  C 0i = 0; i 6= j 2 1; 2 (21)
We can then decompose the e¤ect of ei on Ris mass of customers, @eimi, into three:
1) The number of new customers coming into the market to buy from Ri, and who are
residing in Ris territory, denoted by nii. 2) The number of new customers coming into
the market to buy from Ri, but who are residing in Rjs territory, denoted by n
j
i . 3) The
number of the retailerscurrentcustomers choosing to switch (territories) stores, i.e., a
business-stealing e¤ect, denoted by b.
Similarly, we can decompose the e¤ect of Ris sales e¤ort on Rjs mass of customers,
@eimj, into two: 1) The number of new customers coming into the market to buy from
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Rj, and who are residing in Rjs territory, denoted by bnjj. 2) The number of the retailers
current customers choosing to switch (territories) stores, which is just  b.
Next, we denote by x = @eiqi, the change in consumption for Ris customers, and bybx = @eiqj the change in consumption for Rjs customers. Using this, and by imposing
symmetry, qi = qj = q and mi = mj = m, we can rewrite the vertically integrated rms
rst-order condition as
 
pI   cn nii + nji + bnjj q +m (x+ bx)o  C 0i = 0 (22)
Notice that, by imposing CTD, the manufacturer eliminates both nji and b from @eimi,
as these are the customers that Ri has to turn down. We let  2 [0; 1] denote the share
of nji that, after being turned down, choose to buy from their assigned retailer instead.
( = 0 is the situation where every new customer who is turned down, chooses to exit the
market again.) Hence, with CTD, we have @eimi = n
i
i and @eimj = bnjj + nji . Using this,
we can write M and Ris rst-order condition for maximizing their bilateral joint prot,
given CTD and an industry-wide resale price equal to pI , as 
pI   c  nii + bnjj + nji q +m (x+ bx)  C 0i    bnjj + nji q +mbx  pI   T 0j  = 0
(23)
Substituting in the condition for retailer optimality at the nal stage,
 
pI   T 0i

(niiq +mx) 
C 0i = 0, we get the following conditions for (T
; e) to arise in a contract equilibrium:
(T 0i   c)
 
niiq +mx

+
 
T 0j   c
  bnjjq + njiq +mbx = 0, i 6= j 2 1; 2 (24)
Assuming that niiq + mx >
bnjjq + njiq +mbx, this system again has a unique solution
in which the marginal transfer prices are equal to the manufacturers marginal cost, c.
Hence, given that the manufacturer imposes the vertically integrated price pI , Ris optimal
level of e¤ort is characterized by
 
pI   c (niiq +mx)   C 0i = 0. Comparing this to the
integrated monopolists rst-order condition above, we can see that the retailer will exert
the optimal level of e¤ort, eI , only as long as qbnjj + qnji + mbx = 0, for example whenbnjj = nji = bx = 0. We have the following result.
Proposition 6. (CTD) Given that there are spillovers in sales e¤ort, @eiDj 6= 0, CTD
(possibly in addition to RPM) may help to restore the integrated outcome, but only as long
as 1) the spillover consists of a pure business-stealing e¤ect (@eiDj =  b), and 2) each
retailers sales e¤ort does not attract more customers into the market who resides in the
rivals territory (nji = bnjj = 0). In all other cases, CTD yields either too much or too
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little sales e¤ort in equilibrium.
Note that, without spillovers in e¤ort, industry-wide RPM is enough to restore the inte-
grated outcome, as demonstrated by Proposition 4. With spillovers this is no longer the
case. However in this case, introducing CTD may help to restore the integrated outcome,
but only as long as the spillover consists of a pure business stealing e¤ect, and moreover,
as long as sales e¤ort does not attract more customers into the market from the rivals
territory. Intuitively, this has to be the case because CTD only corrects only for the rst
externality (the business-stealing e¤ect), and does not correct for the second.
5 Discussion
Our results conrm that, generally, purely bilateral, vertical contracts cannot solve the
manufacturers opportunism problem. To fully restore the integrated outcome, the man-
ufacturers contract with Ri would have to be (indirectly) contingent on Rjs price, pj, as
well as the quantity sold, Dj, and vice versa. I.e., the contracts need to include a credible
horizontal commitment from the manufacturer, and this may be di¢ cult to implement in
practice.
One solution that has been proposed in the literature, is for the manufacturer to con-
dition each retailers contract terms explicitly on the terms o¤ered to rival retailers e.g.,
through non-discrimination or most-favoured customer clauses (MFC). This requires the
actual marginal wholesale terms of rival retailers to be veriable in court. However, given
the widespread practice in many industries of negotiating secret, "backroom" discounts
that do not show up on the retailersinvoices, it is reasonable to assume that the actual
wholesale terms are at least di¢ cult to verify.
Other industry-wide practices, such as price xing agreements, may be a more viable
solution, e.g. when facilitated through industry trade agreements. The latter we have seen
implemented in European book markets, e.g. in Spain, France and Germany. Committing
to closed territories (CTD) would be an even more e¤ective solution, as we have shown,
but may be much harder to implement and monitor. Yet, in general, even these types of
horizontal agreements will not su¢ ce to implement the rst-best as long as the rest of the
contract terms are individually negotiated.
As in Hart and Tirole (1990), our results therefore stress the value (in an unregulated
market) for a manufacturer of owning his distribution network. This is a more e¢ cient
way of both curbing opportunism and controlling e¤ort and at the same time compared
to using (purely vertical) contractual restraints, e.g. individual price restraints and rebate
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schemes. Of course, to fully restore the rst-best in our model, both retailers would have to
be fully integrated into the manufacturers network. To see this, suppose the manufacturer
has integrated with retailer 1, and suppose also that the manufacturer can use RPM in
its contract with retailer 2. Evaluated at the rst-best, the rst-order conditions for the
integrated unit at the nal stage of the game, given that retailer 2 has accepted the
contract terms, are
 
pI   c @p1D1 +D1 + (T 02   c) @p1D2 = 0
and  
pI   c @e1D1   C 01 + (T 02   c) @e1D2 = 0
Note that T 02 = p
I for p1 = pI and e1 = eI to be optimal at stage 2 for the integrated
manufacturer. On the other hand, we have the rst order condition for the unintegrated
retailer 2, which is simply
 
pI   T 02

@e2D2  C 02 = 0. But with T 02 = pI , retailer 2 would
exert zero e¤ort, and hence, in general, p1 = p2 = pI and e1 = e2 = eI cannot be achieved
without the manufacturer being fully integrated with both retailers. With di¤erentiated
retailers as in our model, it also follows that the integrated outcome cannot be achieved
through exclusion of retailers.
6 Conclusion
Earlier literature suggest that with unobservable contracts and no importance of retail
sales e¤ort, the opportunism problem may be solved with imposing maximum RPM. As
this raises retail prices, consumers are hurt. On the other hand, with observable contracts
another branch of the literature focuses on how RPM may solve vertical externalities
when there are spillovers between retailers from retail sales e¤ort. When retailers also
exert some sales e¤ort, the latter literature argues that RPM may be e¢ ciency enhancing
by allowing a manufacturer to exert vertical control of retailer sales e¤ort. These contra-
dicting results of the e¤ects of RPM calls for a more unied approach. In this article we
propose such an approach. We consider a model where both opportunism and retail sales
e¤ort are incorporated. This is done by introducing retail sales service with spillovers
in the framework of OBrien and Sha¤er (or unobservable contracts in the framework of
Mathewson and Winter, 1984). By doing this, new insights emerge.
We show that the opportunism problem arising from contract unobservability in verti-
cal relations may be signicant harder to solve than has been recognized in the literature
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before. Specically, the result that maximum RPM mitigates opportunism, as proposed
by OBrien and Sha¤er (1992), breaks down once retail demand depends to any extent of
service provided at the retail level. Since the basic problem stems from positive margins
at the retail level, and the intrinsic temptation to free-ride on the margins, OSs solution
simply was to eliminate these margins by using maximum RPM and high transfer prices.
This is true if retail service has no impact whatsoever on retail demand. If retail sales
e¤ort only has a minimal e¤ect on demand this equilibrium breaks down, as the man-
ufacturer would wish to lower its transfer price to each retailer, inducing higher sales.
Positive margins, in turn, completely reopens the door for opportunism again. We have
shown that when retail service has any positive impact on demand, and for any size and
sign of spillovers from such activity, then there are no own-sale contracts that will solve
the opportunism problem.
However, if contracts are horizontal in nature the opportunism problem may be mit-
igated. For example, if the manufacturer may commit to industry-wide minimum RPM,
the fully integrated outcome may be restored, but only when there are no spillovers from
retailerssales e¤ort. However, if there are (positive or negative) spillovers in retailers
sales e¤ort, the prot realized in equilibrium will be less than the fully integrated prot.
Importantly, and in contrast to the earlier literature on vertical restraints, we nd that
even though the retailers o¤er valuable services, consumers are often harmed when al-
lowing for industry-wide price agreements, given that the contract terms of rivals are
otherwise unobservable; we nd that consumers benet only in cases where 1) retailers
sales e¤ort is critical to generate demand, and 2) erce downstream competition leads to
very little e¤ort being provided without a price agreement.
We also show that closed territory distribution only solves the problem in very specic
circumstances. Finally, we argue that both vertical integration and exclusion will generally
not enable the manufacturer to realize the vertically integrated outcome.
Competition policy in many countries tends to be more hostile against minimum of
xed RPM than maximum RPM. In fact, in most jurisdictions maximum RPM is regarded
as unproblematic. Several recent articles has challenged this view by showing that also
maximum RPM may be detrimental to consumers. Montez (2012) shows that a monop-
olist may avoid the opportunism problem by using buybacks that are sometimes coupled
with maximum RPM. More relevant to our analysis are OBrien and Sha¤er (1992) and
Rey and Verge (2004). They both suggest that maximum RPM may be detrimental to
consumers because it is an instrument to solve the opportunism problem. The most im-
portant policy implication from our analysis is that this suggestion is not very robust. If
retail demand depends to any extent of retail sales e¤ort, maximum RPM has no e¤ect
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on the outcome.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
The following proof follows closely the proof in OBrien and Sha¤er (1992), which we have
modied to encompass both retailerssales e¤ort and RPM.
The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1. For all j 6= i 2 f1; 2g, T j (Dj) is continuous at the quantity induced by T.
Proof. Let Dj be the quantity induced by T
, and suppose that T j (Dj) were not contin-
uous at Dj . Then for some innitesimal change in D

j , T

j would either jump up or jump
down. It cannot jump down, because retailer j could then adjust his e¤ort by a small
amount and induce a discrete reduction in its payment. It cannot jump up, for then M
and Ri could jointly adjust pi and/ or ei, and induce a discrete jump in their bilateral
prots. Hence, T j must be continuous at D

j . Q.E.D.
Step 2. The function T j (Dj) satisfy T
0
j+  T 0j ; for all j 6= i 2 f1; 2g, where T 0j+ and T 0j 
are the right-hand (+) and left-hand (-) partial derivatives of T j , respectively, evaluated
at Dj .
Proof. From step 1, we know that T j has both a left-hand (-) and a right-hand (+)
derivative at Dj . Retailer js rst-order conditions for optimal e¤ort then requires that 
@ejj

  = @ejDj
 
pj   T 0j 
  C 0 (ej)  0 (A1)
and  
@ejj

+
= @ejDj
 
pj   T 0j+
  C 0 (ej)  0 (A2)
using the fact that @ejDj > 0. Together, (A1) and (A2) yields T
0
j+  T 0j  as a necessary
condition for retailer optimality. Q.E.D.
Step 3. The function T j (Dj) satises T
0
j   T 0j+ for all j 6= i 2 f1; 2g ; when evaluated at
Dj = D

j .
Proof. In every contract equilibrium with general own-sale contracts and RPM, the Ms
contract with Ri per denition solves
max
pi;ei
n
(pi   c)Di
 
ei; pi; e

j ; p

j

+ T j   C (ei)
o
(A3)
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This yields the following rst-order conditions for the price pi:
(pi   c) @piDi +Di   @piDjT 0j  (A4)
and
(pi   c) @piDi +Di   @piDjT 0j+ (A5)
using the fact that @piDj > 0. Together, (A4) and (A5) imply that  @piDjT 0j  
 @piDjT 0j+, or T 0j   T 0j+ because  @piDj < 0. Together with step 1, this implies that
T 0j  = T
0
j+ for the contracts to be bilateral best responses with general own-sale contracts
and RPM.
The rest of the proof considers the case where deviations on the price are not possible
(i.e., the case of industry-wide price xing). Note rst that, even thoughM cannot deviate
with Ri on the price pi, as is the case with an industry-wide resale price p, Ms contract
with Ri still has to solve
max
ei
n
(p   c)Di
 
ei; p
; ej ; p
+ T j   C (ei)o (A6)
The case without spillovers is trivial and not important to our results. In the following
we therefore consider only the cases with negative and positive spillovers, respectively.
With negative spillovers, the rst-order conditions for (A6) are
(p   c) @eiDi   C 0 (ei)   @eiDjT 0j+ (A7)
and
(p   c) @eiDi   C 0 (ei)   @eiDjT 0j  (A8)
Together, (A4) and (A5) yield the condition  @eiDjT 0j    @eiDjT 0j+; or T 0j   T 0j+,
because  @eiDj > 0 in this case.
With positive spillovers, the rst-order conditions for (A6) are
(p   c) @eiDi   C 0 (ei)   @eiDjT 0j  (A9)
and
(p   c) @eiDi   C 0 (ei)   @eiDjT 0j+ (A10)
Together, (A9) and (A10) yield the condition  @eiDjT 0j+   @eiDjT 0j ; or T 0j   T 0j+,
because  @eiDj < 0 in this case. Q.E.D.
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The proof is completed by noting that steps 2 and 3 together imply that T 0j  = T
0
j+
when evaluated at Dj = Dj , both for the case with general own-sale contracts and RPM,
and for the case with general non-linear contracts, industry-wide price xing and spillovers
in e¤ort. Q.E.D.
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E t  s e l s k ap  i  NHH -m i l j ø e t
S A M F U N N S -  O G  
N Æ R I N G S L I V S F O R S K N I N G  A S
I n s t i t u t e  f o r  R e s e a r c h  i n  E c o n o m i c s  
a n d  B u s i n e s s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
We study a setting where the opportunism or commitment problem identified by 
Hart and Tirole (1990) may arise. An upstream monopolist may sell its product to 
two differentiated downstream retailers. Contract unobservability induces the man-
ufacturer and each retailer to free-ride on margins earned by rival retailers, resulting 
in low transfer prices and low overall profit. O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) proposed a 
solution to this problem involving squeezing retail margins by using maximum RPM 
and high transfer prices. We show that when retail demand depends in any degree 
on retail sales effort, this equilibrium breaks down, and the opportunism problem 
reappears with full force. We show that no type of own-sale contracts or combination 
of own-sale restraints will solve the problem if sales effort matters. Moreover we 
show that certain horizontal commitments, as for example industry-wide minimum 
RPM, may restore the fully integrated outcome, but only in special cases.
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